Metals resources: products in turmoil by Shea, Michael J.




We are in economic turmoil. By de¢nition, this means that no one knows
what will happen next. In 1998 the Japanese government announced another
¢scal stimulation package (the seventh since 1992) to stabilise the country's
¢nancial system, bolster con¢dence and achieve positive growth in 1999. This
one was the biggest ever, totalling A$320 billion of public works spending
and tax cuts. The e¡ort was supported by the United States when President
Clinton and Prime Minister Obushi announced an `Asian growth and
recovery initiative' package of unspeci¢ed amount or timetable.
But so far it has come to naught ö at least until the time of writing.
Industrial production plunged in the December quarter to record a Japanese
annual contraction of 6.4 per cent. Retail sales fell 4.7 per cent during the
year. The strengthening yen is detrimental for exports, and industrial pro-
duction will stay low at least through 1999. Changes in wage levels (including
the bonus component) will also be negative for another year (estimated down
0.5 per cent). The strong yen derives from a favourable trade balance and
rising current account founded on low import values, with low prices for
energy imports a major contributing factor. The yen will stay high to the
detriment of exports and con¢dence is decidedly fragile.
There is concern that China may initiate another round of Asian currency
devaluations. The government's restructuring policy includes closure of
state-owned enterprises that carried the bulk of social service expenditure.
These enterprises have accumulated massive losses whose funding through
state banks hides the magnitude of the government de¢cit. The enterprise
losses accumulate partly through their social service responsibility and partly
through a continuing imbalance between controlled selling prices and open
market input costs.
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*Michael Shea is Associate Director of AME Mineral Economics, Sydney, NSW.The restructuring policy necessitates a devolution of responsibility right
down to the individual. In the past, economic growth was used as a palliative
to soften the pain of that restructuring. It will be so used again ö and
growth is faltering. Growth rates of less than 6 to 7 per cent mean that social
tensions may become explosive.
Much of the growth orientation is towards export earnings. The
country's terms of trade, however, have deteriorated compared with those
of its neighbours over the last eighteen months. There is every incentive to
devalue. The United States has exerted strong pressure to prevent it ö
threatening to use China's membership application to the World Trade
Organization as a punitive weapon. But the incentive is there. If China
elects to devalue, it will be followed by a new round of defensive
devaluations throughout the region, accompanied by further capital
out£ows, deepening liquidity problems, a return to protectionism and
further delay in recovery of domestic demand. It is the biggest risk facing
the region.
People disagree about the timetable for recovery. Japan, the chief provider
of cash for Asia, will remain mired in recession at least through 1999, and
probably for two full years through 2000. The country is hardly a source of
ready cash. Europe will wrestle with its common currency and spend
prudently to maintain quali¢cation for the Euro. Asia cannot rely on
domestic savings to fuel short-term growth. There is no credit availability
from normal operating sources. Many insolvent Asian companies have not
yet agreed with creditors on programs to work down debt levels ö partly
the result of weak bankruptcy laws.
What is the impact on metal resources? The fundamentals indicate that
base metals prices should be higher. LME stocks have been falling but real
prices are down (see table 1). Driven by strong demand in the United States
and industrialised Europe, order books were healthy in 1998. The economic
pain in emerging nations translates into a low import price bene¢t for
industrialised nations ö muting in£ationary pressure. Falls in export volume
from industrial to emerging nations was delayed into 1999, and had only a
slight impact on the very high value component of total trade. Capacity
utilisation rates in developed economies have not been unduly painful.
For copper, consumption was strong in 1998 and early 1999 (see table
2). US base metals demand was strong generally as a result of new capital
investment in productive plant to relieve high general utilisation rates.
Annual North American copper consumption in tonnage terms grew 6.1
per cent in 1998. Most of the new general plant investment will be
commissioned by the end of 1999 when installed productive plant capacity
will stand at a 20-year high. New US plant investment is re£ected in
improved labour productivity, which increased 4 per cent in the December
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Lead Zinc Copper Lead Zinc Copper
1955 1722 1475 6203 78.1 66.9 281.3
1956 1795 1509 5583 81.5 68.5 253.3
1957 1440 1216 3695 65.3 55.2 167.6
1958 1067 966 3201 48.4 43.8 145.2
1959 1014 1176 3760 46.0 53.3 170.6
1960 1016 1258 3828 46.1 57.1 173.6
1961 894 1082 3543 40.5 49.1 160.7
1962 768 920 3525 34.8 41.7 159.9
1963 851 1029 3472 38.6 46.7 157.5
1964 1330 1551 5108 60.3 70.4 231.7
1965 1478 1450 6664 67.0 65.8 302.3
1966 1177 1262 7591 53.4 57.3 344.3
1967 991 1189 4792 45.0 53.9 217.4
1968 1060 1158 5669 48.1 52.5 257.1
1969 1214 1199 6381 55.1 54.4 289.5
1970 1210 1177 5788 54.9 53.4 262.5
1971 962 1174 4190 43.7 53.3 190.0
1972 1116 1397 3946 50.6 63.4 179.0
1973 1459 2890 6147 66.2 131.1 278.8
1974 1846 3857 6447 83.8 175.0 292.4
1975 1172 2115 3499 53.2 96.0 158.7
1976 1205 1903 3738 54.7 86.3 169.6
1977 1547 1479 3241 70.2 67.1 147.0
1978 1529 1376 3119 69.4 62.4 141.7
1979 2564 1584 4152 116.3 71.9 188.4
1980 1772 1483 4165 80.4 67.3 188.9
1981 1303 1524 3017 59.1 69.1 136.9
1982 907 1241 2383 41.1 56.3 108.1
1983 679 1226 2460 30.8 55.6 111.6
1984 678 1362 2047 30.8 61.8 92.9
1985 578 1130 2062 26.2 51.3 93.6
1986 581 1083 1990 26.4 49.1 90.2
1987 827 1111 2408 37.5 50.4 109.2
1988 880 1667 3431 39.9 75.6 155.7
1989 863 2121 3604 39.2 96.2 163.5
1990 1001 1856 3244 45.4 84.2 147.2
1991 655 1309 2738 29.7 59.4 124.3
1992 618 1416 2603 28.0 64.2 118.1
1993 444 1084 2122 20.2 49.2 96.3
1994 597 1086 2505 27.1 49.3 113.7
1995 668 1092 3104 30.3 49.6 140.8
1996 802 1062 2373 36.4 48.2 107.7
1997 634 1339 2312 28.8 60.8 104.9
1998 528 1023 1653 24.0 46.6 75.0
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the normal annual pace. Productivity gains over the last ten years
averaged 1.1 per cent.
Copper mine and smelter utilisation rates have been above 80 per cent
throughout the world over the past two years. Estimated metal stock cover
was low up to the last quarter of 1998 (comfortable operating levels are 5^6
weeks of consumption). The same can basically be said about zinc (see
table 3). Real falls in mine and smelter utilisation rates will not happen until
next year.
Lead, however, was rather £at in 1998 (see table 4) as motor car assembly
rates declined. Lead demand is mainly derived from battery use in motor
vehicles. Ford Motor Co announced a decrease in its production scheduling,
the Japanese generally forecast a 7 per cent decrease in this year's motor
car production schedule and there is something like 45 per cent idle capacity
in Asian vehicle assembly plants. Demand for lead-acid batteries for the
original equipment sector is likely to be weak. We are still waiting for the
surge in replacement battery demand based on the age of the average battery
in the motor vehicle £eet. 1994 was a peak battery sales year for units now
due for replacement. This normally o¡sets falls in the original equipment
sector. The delay is related to technical improvements extending normal
battery life, together with benign weather conditions which have a major
in£uence on battery failure rates.
Table 2 Copper world market balance (000t Contained Metal)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Production
Mine 10084 11048 11526 11892 12780 13088
Primary Metal 9681 10578 11494 11971 12628 12781
Secondary Metal 2195 2049 2070 1848 1864 1928
Strategic Stocks
Total Metal Available 11876 12627 13564 13819 14492 14709
Consumption 12062 12630 13084 13435 13769 14270
Consumption Growth 4.3% 4.7% 3.6% 2.7% 2.5% 3.6%
Metal surplus (De¢cit) (186) (3) 480 384 723 439
Capacity utilisation
Mine 89% 90% 92% 89% 88% 87%
Re¢neries 85% 88% 89% 84% 85% 83%
Stock cover (wks) 3.5 2.0 4.2 5.3 7.9 9.2
Source: ABARE, February 1999 Outlook.
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Production
Mine 6981 7295 7335 7404 7242 7271
Primary Metal 6862 6916 7236 7391 6832 6958
Secondary Metal 462 509 497 507 451 440
Strategic Stocks 16 17 32 25 40 40
Total Metal Available 7340 7442 7765 7923 7323 7438
Consumption 7513 7539 7758 7797 7359 7388
Consumption Growth 7.8% 0.3% 2.9% 0.5% (5.6%) 0.4%
Metal surplus (De¢cit) (173) (97) 7 126 (36) 50
Capacity utilisation
Mine 85% 83% 71% 79% 73% 70%
Primary Smelters 78% 76% 81% 79% 76% 71%
Stock cover (wks) 11.3 9.2 8.8 8.2 8.4 8.9
Source: ABARE, February 1999 Outlook.
Table 4 Lead world market balance (000t Contained Metal)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Production
Mine 2749 3001 3033 3088 3296 3460
Primary Metal 3086 3046 3110 3103 3197 3340
Secondary Metal 2673 2792 2920 2910 2658 2662
Strategic Stocks 34 38 26 50 50 50
Total Metal Available 5793 5876 6056 6063 5905 6052
Consumption 5858 5992 6011 5985 5916 6046
Consumption Growth 3.4% 2.3% 0.3% (0.4%) (1.2%) 2.2%
Metal surplus (De¢cit) (65) (116) 45 78 (11) 6
Capacity utilisation
Mine 68% 71% 72% 72% 70% 68%
Primary Smelters 62% 62% 64% 61% 63% 62%
Secondary Smelters 71% 72% 79% 77% 77% 76%
Stock cover (wks) 6.2 5.6 5.9 5.5 5.4 5.4
Source: ABARE, February 1999 Outlook.
Metals resources: products in turmoil 401
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1999Prices have been falling throughout 1998 (see ¢gures 1^3) ö well ahead
of any real downturn in end-use consumption. Copper, lead and zinc prices
are all well below their long-term trends expressed in real 1998 US$ values.
Figure 1 Annual average LME copper prices (real 1998 US$) 1955^98
Figure 2 Annual average LME cash zinc prices (real 1998 US$) 1955^98
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Current base metals prices should be higher.
Prices do not appear to be moving in accordance with industry
fundamentals. But is this really the case? We are following £uctuations in
three volatile unknowns ö the behaviour of funds managers, the Japanese
and the Chinese.
2. Managed investment funds
There are some US$120 billion in funds under management. They act like
water in the hull of a sailboat. Their apparent movement will depend on the
heel of the boat. In reality, they are seeking a level of return adequate to
keep their managers in a job. The growth of these funds is partly the result
of population demographics ö the ageing of populations in industrialised
countries, the drawdown of retirement bene¢ts and the shift of funds out of
conservative institutional management with long-term horizons into high
performance management with short-term horizons.
This has added a new term to the lexicon of investors. We had YUPPIE
and DINK ö we now have WOOF, Well O¡ Old Folk. And these WOOFs
require high absolute performance on their money. High relative per-
formance of their fund is not good enough. You see it on the television
Figure 3 Annual average LME cash lead prices (real 1998 US$) 1955^98
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on funds invested or they hire a new manager.
The funds are therefore highly dynamic and highly volatile. But they are
also very professional and there is a rationale. They lead the market. Prices
today re£ect the signals we would normally expect from stock levels and
utilisation rates in the industry in six to nine months' time.
The funds are currently re£ecting the crisis in Asia. Falls in Asian demand
so far have had little e¡ect on direct US and European trade. They do,
however, impact on consolidated revenues of multinationals. This translates
into Wall Street equity values and available ¢nance, and that translates
quickly into reductions in earnings on cash funds under management. The
managed funds represent the conduit by which the Asian virus is contagious
across the world.
3. Other regions
From a metals resource point of view, the Asian crisis must be viewed in a
world context. Asian recovery must be ignited in an environment of low
world metals prices. I want to make two points on US and European future
demand that will keep metals prices low, before amplifying elements peculiar
to Asia.
In the United States, the commissioning of new plant will be largely
complete by the end of 1999. Installed capacity will be high and the pressure
from recent high utilisation rates will be relieved. This inevitably means a fall
or levelling o¡ in the rate of new capital formation and a downturn in
general demand for metals involved in non-residential construction, machine
tools and new productive equipment.
Europe is wrestling with the launch of a common currency. There are rules
for eligibility to join the new currency club, and rules for maintenance of
membership (the `stability pact'). Maintenance of national quali¢cation
requires prudence in government spending. The limit on government de¢cits,
for example, is 3 per cent of GDP. Prudence in spending means a postponement
of infrastructure development which has a direct impact on base metals
demand. Aligned with this is a fairly uniform installation of left-of-centre
governments across Western Europe with stated objectives of relieving social
pressures that come from industry rationalisation. We expect a slowdown in
restructuring, particularly in labour institutional restructuring, resulting in a
slowing of both e¤ciency improvements and general economic growth.
Eastern Europe is oriented towards export to satisfy demand parameters
in other regions. Domestic demand will be a small contributor to world
totals in our forecast horizon. Metal working and machine building have
almost uniformly plunged to below 15 per cent of their pre-1990 levels.
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the technology level of the whole sector ö instruments, machine tools,
electrical engineering and electronics. The contraction rate of these core
activities was triple that of the sector as a whole. This will extensively
constrain the rate of future recovery.
4. Asia
In discussing Asia, it is worth noting that the fundamental problems of
corporate governance, lack of transparency, poor regulatory institutions and
over-leveraging have existed for a long time. They didn't stop the great
economic leaps of the past. They need not stop the recovery. The pace of
recovery will depend on the e¡ectiveness of commercial decisions, not on the
timetable for institutional reform.
Problems arose from excess optimism and insu¤cient weight given to
downside risk. There was a highly leveraged concentration of capital ö
notably in property ö leading to over-capacity and low returns. As Japanese
currency devalued in terms of the US dollar, there was a general fall in the
rate of Japanese capital shift into Asia as the Japanese competitive position
improved. At the same time there was a rise in the Chinese orientation to
export, placing additional competitive pressure on South East Asia.
There were balance of payments and currency management problems.
Current account de¢cits were ¢nanced by short-term capital in£ows. High
weighting was given to the US$ in local currency management ö higher than
justi¢ed by current trade relations. Industries were subject to competitive
deterioration when the US$ appreciated in 1995 (notably against Japanese
yen).
The Thai baht depreciation in July 1997 was the trigger. There were so
many open foreign exchange positions, and such a rush to hedge or close
them when depreciation set in, that the rate of fall was exacerbated and there
was a domino e¡ect throughout South East Asia. The risks are now all too
obvious. For the next three years, Asia could drag its feet in structural
reform and could retreat into protectionism and traditional economic policy.
This is based on fears arising from:
. the crises in Russia and Latin America, with implications both as to
supply source for raw materials and competitor for output;
. a weak political government in Japan and an aggressive stand by
Japanese bureaucracy to achieve recovery by export promotion
(including currency devaluation) in competition with the rest of Asia;
. the risk of losing control of resources and enterprises to cashed-up
Western bargain hunters.
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The key driving economies are Japan and China. Japanese banking
problems are immense. Japanese bank exposure to the ¢ve crisis countries
(Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand) was US$271 billion
at the end of 1997. Exposure to the total emerging market was US$292
billion (compared with US$118 billion of US and US$572 billion of
European Union bank exposure). For Japan, the exposure to the total
emerging nation market represented some 118 per cent of bank capital
(compared with 34 per cent in the United States and 78 per cent in the
European Union).
In Japan, the amount of non-performing loans to be disposed of is
estimated at 20 trillion yen (US$14 billion). This assumes all the impossible,
half the di¤cult and 20 per cent of the careful loan assets will be lost
(in accordance with US regulatory classi¢cations and assumptions). Self-
assessment by the Japanese banks admits that 77 trillion yen (15 per cent of
GDP) are sub-standard questionable loans. This does not include the bad
loans of credit co-operatives.
Permeating the entire question of institutional reform is the decision
methodology in Japan. Much has been said in favour of the political stability
that has existed in that country for the last 40 years. Since 1955, a single
party has almost continuously held a su¤cient number of parliamentary
seats to form a government. Though essentially conservative and oriented
towards business and agriculture, it has been able to function as a broadly
based `catch all' party, with su¤cient £exibility to attract new categories of
support when this proved necessary. It has existed alongside a bureaucracy
which itself existed before the war with the bulk of its powers intact. That
bureaucracy operated for many years under the mantle of US protection,
allowing it to focus on economic development and forge extensive co-
operative links with private enterprise.
The result is a maze of compromises between competitive interest groups,
most of which must be addressed before institutional change can be
achieved. It is simply not enough for world leaders to limit their persuasive
e¡orts to the Prime Ministerial level of government. That o¤ce is relatively
weak and largely symbolic. The relative power of the Japanese Prime
Minister is less than the relative government power of the US or French
Presidents, or the British or Australian Prime Ministers within their domestic
environments. The Japanese even have a term for it: they refer to the o¤ce
as `Kei Tai Yo Sha ö the portable shrine'. It is trotted out whenever the
public image needs polishing. To achieve change, the negotiation of new
compromises must be thorough, and at multiple levels of the society. It takes
time.
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Of the three volatile unknowns a¡ecting minerals ö the funds, the Japanese
and China ö the Chinese are currently the most active in institutional
change that will ultimately a¡ect the Australian minerals industry. A new
nonferrous metals government instrumentality ö the State Nonferrous
Metals Industry Administration (SNMIA) ö started operations early in
1999. It is a replacement for the old China National Nonferrous Metals
Industry Corp (CNNC) which was dissolved in April 1998. At that time, the
old CNNC had some 285 enterprises under its jurisdiction with some 58
per cent in loss positions. Only 25 were quoted as pro¢table in 1997. The
focus of the SNMIA will be industry rationalisation.
The new SNMIA is structured into ¢ve groups representing aluminium,
copper, lead, zinc and rare earths. The groups will gradually take re-
sponsibility for all production decisions and control all assets of the state
enterprises within the industry. I want to use aluminium as an example of
how all this restructuring will a¡ect Chinese exports.
The aluminium group will have ten major smelters under its control and
total assets of about US$5 billion. The aluminium industry must be a
principal target for the nation's overall goal of rationalisation. The country
has ¢ve alumina re¢neries with a combined annual capacity of 3.3Mt, built
near bauxite resources in Henan, Shandong, Guixhou and Shanxi provinces.
Total smelter capacity is 1.9Mt in 75 plants, with eleven major plants
(combined 1.0Mt) and 58 other smelters averaging less than 10kt. The
balance is in small units as low as 800t. Many are well away from the
re¢neries that supply them, and this adds to transport costs.
In the general atmosphere of decentralisation that has prevailed, most of
the smaller smelters are controlled not by the state, but by provincial govern-
ments or local private enterprises and foreign investors in joint ventures.
Before the current round of restructuring, all the re¢neries were owned by
the old CNNC but only 40 per cent of the smelters were within its
jurisdiction. The old CNNC was not in a position to control aluminium
production on a national scale. The new structure under SNMIA may
change all this.
Domestic demand was stable for the ¢rst half of 1998, up 1.8 per cent on
1997, with an increase in packaging, vehicle, refrigerator and can production
o¡set by a fall in construction. This will change in response to a government
policy of stimulating infrastructure development and housing to absorb the
unemployed and ease the pain of institutional restructuring. It will take some
time, however, for this policy to be re£ected in end-use tonnage demand. In
the meantime, domestic o¡take will be less than production, leading to
increased exports and downward pressure on international prices. Metal
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1997. The net impact of restructuring currently under way will be rational-
isation and consolidation, an improvement in e¤ciency and an increase in
exports.
7. Conclusion
We still don't know what will happen next. The timetable for Asian recovery,
however, will be slow ö the better portion of two years through 2000. That
timetable is for slow institutional reform, deferral of infrastructure invest-
ment, nervousness in capital investment, rationalisation and consolidation of
enterprise, slow recovery in domestic demand, an improvement in productive
e¤ciency, increased exports and lower metal prices. The three volatiles ö
funds, Japan and China ö will ensure that the impact of this realisation will
spread quickly throughout the world. It will lead metals price movement well
ahead of physical movement in output, consumption and market balances.
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